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Resumen
En este artículo argumento que tanto el cognitivismo como el contractualismo
liberal defienden una concepción pre-moral del deseo humano que tiene su origen
en la tradición hobbesiana y humeana que ambas teorías comparten. Además, la
interpretación computacional y sintáctica de la ciencia cognitiva defiende la idea,
que Gauthier evidentemente comparte, de que la mente humana –o, en el caso de
Gauthier, la mente del “hombre económico”–, es un mecanismo puramente formal
que se caracteriza por realizar operaciones lógicas y matemáticas. Concluyo que
una concepción unitaria sobre el comportamiento humano subyace a las diversas
teorías psicológicas, morales y políticas que han sido dominantes en la tradición
analítica.
Palabras clave: Ciencias cognitivas, contractualismo liberal, ética, deseo
humano.
Abstract
In this paper, I shall argue that both cognitivism and liberal contractualism
defend a pre-moral conception of human desire that has its origin in the Hobbesian
and Humean tradition that both theories share. Moreover, the computational and
syntactic themes in cognitive science support the notion, which Gauthier evidently
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shares, that the human mind – or, in Gauthier’s case, the mind of “economic man”
– is a purely formal mechanism, characterized by logical and mathematical opera-
tions. I shall conclude that a single conception of human behaviour runs through the
various dominant psychological, moral and political theories of analytic inspiration.
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Introduction
In this paper, I shall try to show how cognitive science, as it is conceived by
some contemporary theories of mind, can be used to support the main psychologi-
cal presuppositions that underlie Gauthier’s liberal contractualism. I shall also
explore the historical transformations in the philosophy of science that made it pos-
sible for Gauthier’s political theory and these theories of mind to have many impor-
tant psychological insights in common. I shall conclude that a single conception of
human behaviour runs through the various dominant psychological, moral and
political theories of analytic inspiration. 
I should say from the start that I am not sympathetic with either the view of cog-
nitive science or the view of contractualism about which I talk here. However, my
main concern is not to criticize these views, which I have done in other papers
[González-Castán (1998), (1997), (1996), (1992)], but to argue that they have pro-
vided a quite specific and cogent theory on human behavior that have greatly influ-
enced our self-conception.
I.  A Very Brief Historical Survey
Since the beginning of philosophical inquiry, psychology has played a central
role in the overall scheme of reality. In particular, psychological ideas have been
important because of their ethical and political implications. Authors with quite dif-
ferent philosophical agendas – such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes and
Hume – have all emphasized these implications. To support this assertion, I shall
remember some historical landmarks. 
Bernard Williams has pointed out that, for Plato and Aristotle, one of the prin-
cipal tasks of philosophy is to give an account of the human soul in which their con-
ception of a moral life could find an indispensable place. These Greek philosophers
believed that the human soul must be described or analyzed in such a way that “if
people properly understood what they were, they would see that a life of justice was
a good not external to the self but, rather, an objective that it must be rational to pur-
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sue” [Williams (1985), pp. 33-34]. Accordingly, psychology is, in a certain sense,
subservient to ethics and politics. Our conception of the soul, of its different parts
and their relationships to each other, is constrained by the requirement that it must
allow us to deem irrational, and undesirable, a human life that does not embody the
proper harmony of these parts. If a person fails to respect the hierarchical order
between the parts of his soul, he will be unable to achieve the state of eudaimonía.
As it is well-known, this classical strategy contrasts dramatically with contrac-
tualist theories of morality; for they just proceed in exactly the opposite direction.
Instead of trying to devise a psychological theory which guarantees a preeminent
place for the ethical life, their aim, as Williams puts it is, “given an account of the
self and its satisfactions, to show how the ethical life (luckily) fits them” [Williams
(1985), p. 32]. Hobbes and Gauthier, among others, pursue this strategy in moral
theory. They believe that the satisfaction of the interests and preferences of the
agent has a certain kind of priority over the morality of his acts. Morality has a place
in people’s lives because, given a certain conception of the psychology of human
beings, and of their interactions in a hypothetical situation before the creation of
society, to act morally is to act rationally, that is, in the agent’s own interest. Thus,
the aim of contractualism is to defend the doctrine that being moral is rational and
advantageous for the agent.
The ethical significance of psychological theories is also evident in some other
philosophies, such as Descartes’ and Hume’s. Thus, Descartes´ attempt to prove the
immateriality of the rational soul – not its immortality – was partly motivated by the
desire to prove that certain Christian doctrines are reasonable. Hume, for his part,
criticized Cartesian dualism on the grounds that it is incapable of providing a non-
religious foundation for morality.
All of these direct relationships between psychology and practical thinking dis-
appeared gradually as psychology tried to establish an independent and respectable
place among the natural sciences, and it became common to suppose that the evi-
dent and deliberate connections between psychology and ethics which I have men-
tioned, were explained by the fact that psychology had formed a part of philosophy,
which was considered to be a speculative and non-scientific discipline. With this
assertion I do not mean to imply that professional psychologists took no interest in
the practical consequences of their theories. Many did. Skinner, for example, in his
book Beyond Freedom and Dignity, went to considerable pains to explore the ethi-
cal consequences of behaviorism. His technology of conduct was designed to solve
practical and moral problems by providing us with a new explanation of human
behaviour that would, ideally, have the same predictive power as biological or phys-
ical theories. Freud’s psychological theories also have immediate practical conse-
quences. For if an agent is not always responsible for his behaviour, because there
are unconscious determinants of his acts, then there will be cases in which we
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should treat people clinically, rather than punish them, when they fail to act as they
should.
Nevertheless, a psychologist who regards psychology as one of the natural sci-
ences may feel inclined to object as follows. Certainly, Skinner made inferences
from behaviorism, to support a rational conception of what human moral life should
look like. However, his conclusions should not be regarded as part of psychology
itself; but rather, as a speculative entertainment which draws on psychology; some-
thing a psychologist may engage in as a sort of intellectual hobby. And if psycho-
analysis appears to have important consequences for human practice, this is due to
the fact that psychoanalysis is not a theory that meets the standards of scientific
inquiry – as Popper, among others, has argued. Popper argued that since psychoan-
alytical theory is consistent with any logically admissible description of human con-
duct, it is not falsifiable, and hence it is unscientific [Popper (1982), p. 46]. And one
can also argue that psychoanalysis can make its incursions into the practical realm
because it uses a vocabulary which is not strictly scientific, and which therefore
leaves more room for imaginative speculation, unconstrained by the rigour of scien-
tific reasoning. Psychoanalysis would not be, and has never been, as some psycho-
analytical schools of Lacanian inspiration have pointed out, a scientific theory but
rather a philosophical theory about the self. 
Now, a basic intuition about the nature of science, many times attributed to
Hume, underlies this sort of detachment of psychology from ethics. The intuition is
that the propositions of natural sciences have no practical or normative content, and
carry no implications concerning matters of value. Wittgenstein, for example, per-
suasively defended the radical separation of science and ethics, particularly in the
Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, the description and explanation of states of
affairs, which is the business of science, has no ethical implications whatsoever. The
description of a murder is no more or less significant than the description of a
falling stone, for both alike are descriptions of natural facts. The first differs from
the second, inasmuch as it involves psychological facts. But neither description has
any ethical implications. Accordingly, Wittgenstein considers that ethics belongs
outside the limits of our language, and our world, because sentences which have a
sense can only refer to natural states of affairs, and our world is made exclusively
out of these states of affairs. Thus, if psychology aspires to be a natural science,
none of its propositions can have any ethical significance. And both cognitive scien-
ce and contemporary analytic philosophy of mind have inherited this self-imposed
limitation.
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II.  Cognitive Science and Ethics
As is generally acknowledged, cognitive psychology developed, at least partly,
as a reaction to behaviourism. One of the key aims of this reaction was to accord a
respectable scientific status to the intermediate variables that had been postulated
by psychological theorists – such as Hull and Tolman – before the ascendancy of
Skinner’s behaviorism. Cognitive science, therefore, interpreted these intermediate
variables between inputs and outputs as inner states of the organism, and regarded
these inner states in turn as mental states. In this way, mental states of various sorts
regained the explanatory role in psychology that they had lost during the reign of
behaviorism. Conduct, the subject matter of psychology, was therefore conceived as
the outcome of causal interactions between mental states. The classical formula
‘belief + desire cause behaviour’ is a brief way of expressing this fundamental doc-
trine.
The immediate appeal of this explanatory scheme lies in the fact that it enables
us to connect the most general strategy of scientific psychology, as it is summarized
by many leading philosophers of mind, with our commonsense psychology; for our
folk psychology is also characterized by the use of terms such as “belief” and
“desire”. And we explain our own and other people’s behaviour in terms of this
intentional vocabulary. Smith opened the refrigerator because he desired a glass of
milk and believed that the milk was in the fridge, ceteris paribus. In this way, it is
possible to preserve a categorial continuity between the psychological discourse
that we use in our ordinary conversations and the discourse that is characteristic of
scientific psychology; and the difference between folk psychology and scientific
psychology does not lie in their basic vocabulary, but in certain restrictions that the
scientific method imposes on our common way of thinking. Thus, the overt behav-
iour that we try to explain causally by appealing to mental states of all kinds has
such a complex etiology that it forces us, when we apply the standards of scientific
method, to postulate entities – sentences in the language of thought and the like –
whose properties have little in common with the properties that folk psychology
usually attributes to our mental states. But despite this fact, these hypothetical enti-
ties preserve the causal powers that we intuitively attribute to mental states.
Furthermore, these hypothetical entities are regarded as the true referents of our
everyday mental terms, and hence as mental states and processes with causal pow-
ers. The advantage of these postulated entities by comparison with mental states as
they are conceived of in folk psychological explanations of behaviour, is that they
can be easily identified with states of the brain. So there is nothing odd about them
from a materialist point of view. These theses are characteristic, for example, of
Fodor’s and Garfield’s psychological realism [Fodor (1987), Garfield, (1988)].
All this can be summarized by saying that folk psychology, as part of the man-
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ifest image of man-in-the-world, in Sellars’s sense, is the starting point of scientific
psychology and the foundation that makes the task of psychology intelligible. Of
course, not all philosophers of mind accept this approach to the philosophy of psy-
chology. Eliminative materialists obviously do not accept it. But, for the purposes
of this paper, I do not need to discuss the problems involved in these different points
of view.
Unfortunately, the attempt to preserve the intentional vocabulary and to intro-
duce inner mental states into the scientific explanation of behaviour did not signal
a renewed interest in the practical consequences of psychology. To a great extent,
cognitive psychology arose as an internal revolution within scientific psychology,
as an attempt to overcome the explanatory schemes, epistemological presupposi-
tions, and ontological limitations of behaviorism. Thus, the main motivation of cog-
nitivism was not the idea that behaviorism had undesirable practical consequences
so far as human liberty and dignity are concerned, and that we should try to avoid
these consequences, if possible, by reforming the foundations of our psychological
theories. In fact, these ethical considerations barely appeared in the philosophical
literature that discussed behaviourism and related issues in the philosophy of mind.
One important outcome of the reaction against behaviorism was this: cognitive
science rehabilitated the intentional explanation of behaviour – after effecting a
major change in our conception of mental states – and with it the prospect of
smoothly accommodating this form of explanation within a mechanistic model of
the mind, elaborated against a materialistic and scientific background. Nevertheless,
for many philosophers, these two achievements are not compatible, appearances
notwithstanding. For eliminativists, although intentional explanations have their
origin in folk psychology, and are therefore deeply rooted in our culture, we can dis-
pense with them, because we can devise a more powerful way of explaining behav-
iour by using the non-intentional vocabulary of neurobiology, than by using the
intentional idiom of mental states. For other philosophers, the very idea that expla-
nations of behaviour can be both mechanistic and intentional is contradictory,
because intentional explanations go hand in hand with the possibility of attributing
responsibility to an agent. For example, Dennett has claimed that “explanations that
serve to ground verdicts of responsibility are couched at least partly in terms of the
beliefs, intentions, desires, and reasons of the person or agent held responsible”
[Dennett (1981), p. 234]. The problem is that mechanisms are not responsible for
their behaviour or its effects.
If this is true, then there is an inconsistency at the heart of cognitive science:
intentionality and mechanism are inconsistent. Nevertheless, Dennett has argued
persuasively that intentional explanations of behaviour are compatible with mecha-
nistic explanations, that is, with explanations that are related to the design and the
physical stances [Dennett (1981a), p. 237]. If we adopt the intentional stance, we
Óscar L. González-Castán Cognitive Science and Liberal Contractualism
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 30 Núm. 1 (2005): 63-75
68
thereby commit ourselves to attributing rationality to the system whose behaviour
we are explaining, but this commitment does not preclude mechanistic explanations
of the same behaviour.
One reason we are tempted to suppose that mechanistic explanations preclude intention-
al explanations is no doubt that since mechanistic explanations (in particular, physical
explanations) are for the most part attempted, or effective, only in cases of malfunction-
ing or breakdown, where the rationality of the system is obviously impaired, we asso-
ciate the physical explanation with a failure of intentional explanation, and ignore the
possibility that a physical explanation will go through (however superfluous, cumber-
some, unfathomable) in cases where intentional explanation is proceeding smoothly.
[Dennett (1981a), p. 243]
Mechanistic and intentional explanations are therefore fully compatible.
However, according to Dennett, the moral evaluation of behaviour and the attribu-
tion of responsibility do not come into the picture with the intentional explanation
of behaviour – that is, with what he calls “the intentional stance”, but with “the per-
sonal stance”. He writes as follows:
One adopts the intentional stance towards any system one assumes to be (roughly)
rational, where the complexities of its operation preclude maintaining the design stance
effectively. The second choice, to adopt a truly moral stance towards the system (thus
viewing it as a person), might often turn out to be psychologically irresistible given the
first choice [to adopt the intentional stance], but it is logically distinct... We might, then,
distinguish a fourth stance, above the intentional stance, called the personal stance. The
personal stance presupposes the intentional stance (note that the intentional stance pre-
supposes neither lower stance) and seems, to cursory view at least, to be just an annex-
ation of moral commitment to the intentional. [Dennett (1981a), p. 240]
Unfortunately, Dennett does not explain in detail how should we understand the
concept of “a truly moral stance” or “the personal stance”, although he provides
with some conditions of personhood that any personal stance should meet [Dennett
(1981b)]. We do not know if the truly moral stance is Aristotelian, Kantian,
Hobbesian, Utilitarian or a mixture of some of these. He only says that if we choose
to adopt the personal stance, this is a pragmatic choice, made in the light of our aims
and desires, and that, consequently, we are probably neither right nor wrong if we
fail to treat a system, even a person, morally [Dennett (1981a), p. 241]. If this is so,
then the moral point of view is still threatened, since we can, at least in principle,
choose to adopt a different stance instead – the design, the physical or the intention-
al stance – without hampering our explanations of behaviour except, perhaps, to the
extent that we make them more cumbersome.
I think these considerations make it clear that cognitive science, as it is con-
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ceived by several influential philosophers of mind, coheres with the fundamental
intuition in the philosophy of science, according to which the propositions of natu-
ral science have no axiological content or consequences. If we choose to treat a sys-
tem from an ethical or personal point of view, this cannot be a choice that was
forced upon us by any considerations pertaining to the ontological commitments
and presuppositions of cognitive science. It depends exclusively upon our personal
interests. Cognitive science and ethics are two quite different domains, because the
objects that are the subject matter of cognitive sciences are premoral items that, at
most, are associated with the intentional stance, and, possibly on occasion, the per-
sonal stance; but it cannot be compelled by the conclusions of scientific psycholo-
gy to adopt the personal stance towards ourselves or others. In the final analysis, it
seems that in order to have a natural science of behaviour without abandoning men-
talism, we need to concede that the application of expressions such as “morally
right” and “morally wrong” to behaviour has no empirical justification.
I think we can reinforce this conclusion by briefly, and somewhat cursorily, con-
sidering two typical strategies that the philosophy of mind has used to characterize
mental states. These strategies are distinct, but closely interrelated. Their common
presupposition is that mental states, inasmuch as they are conceived as efficient
causes of behaviour, should be conceived in a morally neutral way. If our behaviour
is the function of our beliefs and desires, and if a scientific treatment of these inner
states is possible, then beliefs and desires cannot have any moral properties.
The first strategy to strip mental states of any moral significance is to regard
them as functional states of the brain. According to the computational version of
functionalism, mental processes are like programs running in the hardware of a
computer. But a consequence that many philosophers of mind have drawn from this
thesis is that mental processes are real but, in principle, inaccessible to conscious-
ness. And unconscious mental states that are in principle inaccessible to conscious-
ness cannot have moral properties. How can it be right or wrong to be in such a
state, if one cannot know whether one is in it or not? Such states can have functions,
which are defined by their causal roles, but they cannot be good nor bad in any
moral sense of these terms.
The second strategy consists in defining mental states in a morally neutral way.
Searle, who has consistently criticized the idea that there are unconscious mental
states that are in principle inaccessible to consciousness, has argued that all inten-
tional mental states have a direction of fit [Searle (1992), pp. 151-173]. Beliefs have
a mind/world direction of fit. If our beliefs are false, then we have to change them
but do not need to change the world. Desires, on the contrary, have a world/mind
direction of fit. If our desires are not satisfied by the way the world is, then we will
tend to change the world in order to satisfy them [Searle (1983)]. But in doing so,
we will not take into account whether these desires are morally legitimate. The con-
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tent of your desires can be anything whatsoever. Your behaviour and your disposi-
tion to change the world will be explained by your desires in conjunction with your
beliefs. In this way, desires, as they are described by Searle, are neutral from an eth-
ical point of view. In fact, Searle, like many other philosophers of mind, endorses a
Humean conception of desire. Desires are not expressions of a set of moral rules
and values that the agent has internalized and organized in a given way [MacIntyre
(1988), p. 76]. Desires are just nude facts that the world satisfies or fails to satisfy.
If this is the notion of desire that cognitive sciences defend, then it is a premoral
idea.
The joint effect of these two strategies can be reinforced by another considera-
tion. As we have seen, cognitive science conceives of mental states as being
detached of moral properties. For cognitive science, mental states simply are effi-
cient causes of behaviour. Only in this way can they be taken seriously as objects
of investigation by natural science. However, it could be argued, as Aristotelian
philosophers surely would do it, that desires will never have normative value if they
are not essentially characterized by the object that is desired and by the desirability
of this object within the life of a rational individual and of a certain community.
This assertion amounts to the thesis that desires can only have normative value if
they are explained in terms of final causes and of the desirability of these causes in
each particular situation. That desires only have efficient powers means that they
are essentially non-moral items that cause behaviour in a non-moral sense. This pic-
ture is coherent because cognitive sciences should have explanatory value not only
for human beings but also for animals and, perhaps, for certain complicated
machines as well. And the behaviour of these two latter kinds of objects does not
have moral characteristics, at least, prima facie. 
For these various reasons, the rehabilitation of mental states by cognitive scien-
ce has not been accompanied by a rehabilitation of the idea that the explanation of
behaviour is intrinsically moral or that it has moral implications. Just the opposite.
Any moral property of a mental state will fall outside the purview of science, and
therefore outside the scientific conception of the world. Hence, the items that appear
in the old scheme “belief + desire cause behaviour” lack any moral significance.
III.  Gauthier’s Contractualism and Psychological Theory
If this is so, how can we draw moral conclusions from these theoretical founda-
tions? How can cognitive science make a contribution to moral inquiry? And if it
cannot make any contribution at all, does it pose a threat to ethics? I shall answer
these questions briefly, and in specific connection with Gauthier’s liberal contrac-
tualism. 
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Gauthier defends a subjectivist and relativist conception of value. By “subjec-
tivism”, I mean the thesis that value is dependent on the agent’s appetites or prefer-
ences; and by “relativism”, in this context, I shall mean the thesis that value is rel-
ative to each individual. According to Gauthier, since it is always possible for two
individuals to attach a different value to the same state of affairs, even though they
are both fully informed and fully reflective and experienced, it follows that the
deepest roots of the differences between evaluations do not lie in knowledge but in
desire [Gauthier (1986), pp. 49-50]. And it also follows that neither one of two dif-
ferent evaluations is morally better than the other: on the contrary, desires and pref-
erences are all, in principle, on an equal footing from a moral point of view.
Gauthier completely subscribes Hume´s thesis according to which it is not more
rational to desire the annihilation of the world than to have a scratch in one finger.
Accordingly, desires are non-moral or pre-moral items that set the stage for differ-
ent evaluations. In this respect, both liberal contractualism and the philosophy of
mind share a very important thesis, namely, both of them defend a premoral con-
ception of desire. 
The protagonist of Gauthier’s theory, “economic man”, is at the outset a non-
moral being who is equipped with desires and preferences characterized in this way.
Apart from these desires and preferences, economic man also possesses a “natural
endowment” that Gauthier defines as “what one brings to society, to market and
cooperative interaction” [Gauthier (1986), p. 220]. This “natural endowment”
should not be the result of coercion. Rational bargaining and cooperation are only
possible if this requirement is satisfied. The task of moral theory would then be to
explain how moral considerations would arise from a base-line – a state of nature,
in Hobbes’s sense – which is defined by the natural endowment of individuals, and
their desires and preferences.
We are committed to showing why an individual, reasoning from non-moral premises,
would accept the constraints of morality in his choices. [Gauthier (1986), p. 5]
Gauthier’s well-known answer is that moral considerations are rational con-
straints on the maximization-seeking behaviour of economic man in an environ-
ment in which the conditions of a perfect competitive market do not hold because
there are free-riders and externalities, i.e., goods that an individual can enjoy with-
out “paying” for them. Given that Gauthier identifies rationality with economic
rationality, and this latter with the mathematical calculus that decision theory pro-
vides, it follows that rational moral principles stem from, and are justified by, a
‘computation’ that applies the tools of rational decision theory to a base-line that is
prior to any moral assumptions.
This being so, we can see that cognitivism lies at the root of liberal contractu-
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alism as a condition and justification of the human psychology that this theory
endorses. It is clear that both cognitivism and liberal contractualism defend a pre-
moral conception of human desire that has its origin in the Hobbesian and Humean
tradition that both theories share. Cognitive science has done Gauthier a tremendous
favour, because it has provided his moral theory with a scientific background. The
main achievement of cognitive science, in this regard, has been to strip mental states
entirely of moral properties. Furthermore, the computational and syntactic themes
in cognitive science, support the notion, which Gauthier evidently shares, that the
human mind – or, in Gauthier’s case, the mind of “economic man” – is a purely for-
mal mechanism, characterized by logical and mathematical operations. According
to classical computational and syntactic theories within cognitive science, the
human mind is a computational device, and mental processes consist in the manip-
ulation of representations according to algorithms which are defined in purely syn-
tactic terms. Behaviour is the causal outcome of these processes [Cfr. Stich (1983)
and Fodor (1987)]. Analogously, Gauthier claims that “economic man” is “con-
ceived as an independent centre of activity, endeavouring to direct his capacities
and resources to the fulfilment of his interests. He considers what he can do, but ini-
tially draws no distinction between what he may and may not do” [Gauthier 1986,
p. 9]. In order to fulfil his interests and satisfy his desires in an environment in
which there are parasites and externalities, economic man will apply the formal cal-
culus of rational decision theory to his interaction with other individuals like him.
Economic man is therefore defined as a “mechanism” which applies a formal cal-
culus, a computation, to his preferences and desires without any regard to their
morality. This is the process of rational choice.
It could be argued that this partial match between certain strands in cognitive
science and Gauthier’s liberal contractualism does not indicate a defect in this moral
theory. For any moral theory that claims our rational allegiance should be in gener-
al harmony with the well-established results of cognitive science and, in turn, with
their philosophical basis. If not, it can, for this reason, be suspected of involving a
fallacy. Goldman, for example, has argued in this fashion. In particular, he has held
that scientific psychology “may impinge on prescriptive ethics, viz., by setting con-
straints of realism or feasibility” [Goldman (1993), p. 640]. He spells out this asser-
tion in the following way.
A moral code that is psychologically unrealizable by human beings, or just too demand-
ing for people to satisfy, might be rejected on meta-ethical grounds. Not all moral the-
orists would accept this constraint ... Nevertheless, it is plausible to impose a constraint
like Owen Flanagan’s Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism. [Goldman 1993, pp.
640-641]
Flanagan’s Principle says this: “make sure when constructing a moral theory or
Óscar L. González-Castán Cognitive Science and Liberal Contractualism
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 30 Núm. 1 (2005): 63-75
73
projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and behaviour pre-
scribed are possible... for creatures like us” [Flanagan (1991), p. 32]. Gauthier’s the-
ory probably passes Flanagan’s test, whereas if Gauthier is right, Rawls’s does not,
because the condition of equality that the original position requires is practically
unattainable for most people.
Nevertheless, it is one thing to say that our moral theories had better not contra-
dict our psychological theories or their philosophical foundations, and quite anoth-
er to accept these theories without trying to change or improve them as we move
from the science of behaviour to ethics. Aristotelianism, for example, is incompat-
ible with certain fundamental philosophical doctrines presupposed by cognitive
science, as it stands. And if we accept these doctrines, we are therefore bound to dis-
tort the truths about ethics that Aristotle understood. For example, Aristotelian
ethics includes the doctrine that desires are already expressions of our character, and
of the norms of the cultures and groups to which we belong. Hence, they cannot
provide “data that are neutral between rival moral claims” as liberal contractualism
would pretend [MacIntyre (1988), p. 76]. If this is true, desires are not premoral
items. On the contrary, they are expressions of our moral habits. Aristotelians are
not bound to reject the general scheme ‘belief + desire cause behaviour’. But they
are bound to insist that the items which appear in this formal scheme have moral
properties, and that ethics cannot consider beliefs and desires, as perhaps cognitive
science can, in abstraction from these moral properties, since they are directly
involved and fully implicated in moral theory. The psychological foundations of
Gauthier’s moral contractualism, by contrast, is thoroughly compatible with the
philosophical foundations of cognitive science, just as it stands. Gauthier does not
need to modify or enrich the conception of mental states advanced by cognitive
science in the least. He can adopt this conception just as it is, and combine it with
other specific theoretical elements – the concept of economic man, bargaining, etc.
– in order to elaborate his moral theory. Thus, liberal contractualism and cognitive
science form a unitary explanatory framework of human behaviour in a twofold
dimension: the psychological and the ethical. For this kind of framework, the moral
stance is simply the intentional stance, when we interpret the presupposition of
rationality that defines the latter in an instrumental and economic sense.
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